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Kelly: Pegram v. Herdrich

THE EFFECT OF PEGRAM v. HERDRICH 1 ON HMO
LIABILITY
Dawn Maie Kelly
I.

2

INTRODUCTION

Cynthia Herdrich placed her trust and her life in the hands
of her physician and her Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) . The result of this trust was a ruptured appendix and life
threatening peritonitis. 4 The Supreme Court's decision in the
subsequent lawsuit, Pegram v Herdrich,5 redefined the potential
liability of HMOs for their fiduciary obligations and for the
negligence of HMO physicians.
In addition to state medical malpractice claims, Herdrich
filed claims against the physician, Lori Pegram, and Carle Health
Insurance Management Co., (Carle), the HMO for fraud,
claiming that the benefit plan's cost saving incentives resulted in
diagnostic procedures and treatment being withheld from
Herdrich. While Herdrich prevailed in state court on her medical
malpractice claims, the defendants used a provision in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19746 (ERISA) to
remove the remaining state fraud counts to federal court. 7 After
dismissing one count of fraud, the District Court gave Herdrich
leave to amend the remaining fraud count. Herdrich amended her
complaint to include breach of fiduciary duty, and sought relief
under ERISA, claiming that the HMO's incentive breached a
fiduciary duty by creating a conflict of interest between plan
participants, or patients, and plan fiduciaries, or physicians and
managers of the HMO. 8

530 U.S. 211, 215 (2000)
2 J.D.

Candidate Touro Law Center 2003; M.P.A. Candidate Long Island
University C.W. Post Campus 2004.
' Pegram, 530 U.S. at 215.
4id.
5id.

629 U.S.C. § 1109 (1994).
7 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 215.
8 Id. at 217.
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ERISA 9 was signed by President Ford on Labor Day 1974

with the purpose of creating a uniform method of regulating
employee retirement plans nationwide. 10 By federally regulating
employee pension plans, Congress sought to cure the
mismanagement and underfunding of the plans by eliminating
conflict between state and federal regulations. 1 In order to
accomplish this uniformity, ERISA contained a preemption
clause, preempting all state laws that "relate to" an employee
health or welfare plan. 12
In 1973 the Health Maintenance Organization Act of
197313 (HMO Act) was enacted as a response to the rising cost of
health care. 14 Prior to this act the states retained exclusive
control over HMOs. 15 The HMO Act contained a provision
preempting any conflicting state law. 16 The goal of Congress was
to encourage the start up of HMOs, which are prepaid medical
plans, by providing loan guarantees and grants to HMOs as well
as incentives to business to include an HMO option for their
employees. 17 By encouraging the growth of HMOs, Congress
sought to stem the rising costs of the fee-for-service health care
system. Despite the slow growth of HMOs until the 1980's, total
HMO enrollments exceeded sixty million by the year 2000.18
9 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1200 (1994)).
10 Thomas R. McLean, M.D. -& Edward P. Richards, Managed Care
Liability for Breach of Fiduciary duty after Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of
ERISA Preemptionfor State Law Liability for Medical Care Decision Making,
53 FLA. L. REv. 1, 9 (2001).
u1Justin Goodyear, What is an Employee Benefit Plan?: ERISA Preemption
of "Any Willing Provider" Laws After Pegram, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1107,
1110 (2001).
1229 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994 & Supp. 2001).
13Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87
Stat. 914 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-300e(17) (1994 & Supp.
2001)).
14 Jason A. Glodt, Watch Out HMOs: The Future of Patients' Rights
Will
Soon Be Determined, 45 S.D. L. REv. 640 (2000).
1Id.
1642 U.S.C.

§ 300e(10) (1994 & Supp. 2001).

17Glodt, supra note 14, at 641.

18Id.
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HMOs employ a host of cost cutting measures, including
limiting diagnostic and treatment tools available to their patients.
Many of these tools delay or diminish treatment available to the
patients. Although state medical malpractice claims are still
available against the physicians themselves, an HMO cannot
typically be sued for medical malpractice, and any state fraud
claims may be removed to federal court under ERISA, leaving
the patient with only the tenuous ERISA claim of breach of
fiduciary duty. There is no claim for malpractice or negligence
under ERISA. Without a cause of action on which to base a
claim, the defendant HMO may never pay for the results of their
cost cutting measures. In order to survive a motion for dismissal
after a claim has been preempted by ERISA, plaintiffs must make
an ERISA based claim.
In order to withstand the motion to dismiss her fraud
counts, Herdrich amended her claim to include the ERISA based
cause of action of breach of fiduciary duty by the administrators
of the HMO, Carle. The holding in Pegram, barring treatment
decisions made by physicians based on covered benefits as breach
of fiduciary duty against HMOs, was lauded by HMOs. 19
Essentially, this eliminated any possible claim against the HMO
There was, however, another result of the
under ERISA.
decision in Pegram. If a plan is found to control physician
decisionmaking, the HMO will be liable for negligence along
with the physician, and will not be preempted by ERISA. This
opened new doors in state court for plaintiffs denied treatments
by their HMO physicians.
Although the cause of action of breach of fiduciary duty
under ERISA was eliminated as a claim against HMOs as a result
of Pegram, not all HMO plans fall into the category of claims
that will be preempted by ERISA. Plans that hold physicians out
as their agents, or maintain control over physician
decisionmaking will be held liable in state court along with the
physician.
This note examines the Pegram decision and its potential
The Court's decision in
impact on claims against HMOs.
'

Goodyear, supra note 11, at 10.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2001

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 [2001], Art. 7

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 17

Pegram should prove to be an important one in the arena of
HMO liability, creating new possibilities for state causes of action
for victims of HMO negligence.
The elimination of the
preemption of some types of negligence claims against HMOs
allows the potential for plaintiffs to keep their claims in state
court, where the claim may be analyzed in a manner resembling a
state malpractice claim against a physician. The plaintiff would
now have the same opportunities to seek remedy from the HMO
as the plaintiff can now seek against the physician.
Section II of this article discusses the decision in Pegram
v. Herdrich, and the Court's reasoning behind the holding.

Section III explains the incentives for HMO cost cutting, as well
as the methods the HMOs use to contain costs. Section IV
explains ERISA, including the issues surrounding preemption,
fiduciary duties under ERISA, the circumstances that trigger a
fiduciary duty, and the remedies that are available. Section V
discusses some methods employed to avoid ERISA preemption,
and Section VI concludes with a discussion of what the future
may hold for claims against HMOs as a result of the Pegram
decision.
II.

PEGRAM v. HERDRICH

Cynthia Herdrich visited her doctor, Lori Pegram, a
physician-owner of Carle Clinic Association, P.C., Health
Alliance Medical Plans, Inc., and Carle Health Insurance
Management Co., Inc. 20 These organizations cooperatively serve
as a for-profit HMO,and are referred to collectively as Carle. 2'
The HMO was a part of Herdrich's health care insurance
provided by her husband's employer, State Farm Insurance. 22
Herdrich, complaining of pain in her groin, went to her
HMO seeking medical care. Six days later Pegram discovered an
"inflamed mass in Herdrich's abdomen." 23
Rather than
20
21

id.
id.

22
23

Id.
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 215.
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recommending an immediate ultrasound examination at a local
facility, Pegram scheduled an appointment eight days later in a
Carle staffed facility more than fifty miles away.24 Herdrich's
25
appendix ruptured prior to the appointment, causing peritonitis.
In the lawsuit that followed, Herdrich filed claims in state
court against Pegram and Carle for medical malpractice and
fraud. 26 Claiming that ERISA preempted the fraud counts, the
defendants removed the case to federal court, and sought
summary judgment on the fraud counts. 27 Dismissing one fraud
count, the District Court gave Herdrich leave to amend the
other.28 She did so by claiming breach of ERISA fiduciary duty,
under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), based on the incentive program
utilized by Carle. 29 Herdrich alleged that the cost cutting
incentive programs utilized by Carle to encourage its physicians
to reduce costs by limiting medical care "entailed an inherent or
anticipatory breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty, since these terms
created an incentive to make decisions in the physicians' self
30
interest, rather that the exclusive interests of plan participants."
Although the state malpractice charges were tried and won by the
plaintiff, the District Court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss the ERISA fiduciary claim. 3 1 The decision to dismiss
was later reversed by the32Seventh Circuit, and finally brought
before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court analyzed the fiduciary duty claim,
The
ultimately reversing the Seventh Circuit decision.33
unanimous decision in Pegram held that HMOs are not ERISA
plans, and that medical treatment decisions are not governed by

Id.
id.
26 id.
24
25

27

id.

28

Id. at 216.

29

Pegram, 530 U.S. at 216.

30

id.

3 Id. at 217.
32

Id.
33 Id.
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ERISA fiduciary duty provisions. 34 The results of this decision
are twofold. HMOs are no longer liable in federal court under
ERISA for medical decisionmaking; however, by holding that
ERISA does not preempt all claims against HMOs, the
organizations may be held liable under state malpractice and
fiduciary duty laws.
The Court in Pegram realized that the for-profit HMO
would be virtually eliminated by considering mixed eligibility
decisions, decisions that combine benefit eligibility with treatment
decisions, to be fiduciary decisions.35 Since an HMOs profit is
obtained from the residual of fixed membership fees minus costs
for salary and care, "no HMO organization could survive
without some incentive connecting physician reward with
treatment rationing. " 36 The Court determined that the resulting
potential elimination of the for-profit HMO is contrary to
congressional intent.37 The Court also noted that to interpret a
mixed decision as a breach of fiduciary duty claim would "boil
down to a malpractice claim, and the fiduciary standard would be
nothing but the malpractice standard traditionally applied in
actions against physicians. " 38 The Court determined that there
was no reason to turn what was traditionally a state malpractice
claim into a federal claim. Doing so would only serve to clog the
federal courts with malpractice cases, as well as to remove simple
negligence claims from the forum most suited to hear them.39
III.

FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO LIMIT CARE

Before the creation of HMOs in the 1960's, medical
services were traditionally offered on a "fee-for-service" basis.4O
The physician provided treatment and then submitted a bill to the
patient or the patient's insurance company. The physician set his
Id. at 236.
3 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 233.
14

36

id. at 220.

37 id.
38

1 d. at 235.

39 id.
40

Id. at 218.
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own fees, which were paid by the patient or the insurance
company, and the physician was reimbursed for care actually
provided.
Using this method, the financial incentive for the
physician is to "provide more care, not less, so long as payment
[is] forthcoming. , 42 Many critics of this model of health care
believe that fee-for-service medicine encouraged overutilization
of services, and the practice of defensive medicine. 43
Alternatively, under an HMO, the physician contracts
with the organization and receives a fixed fee for each patient he
treats, regardless of the amount of treatment or care provided.
The HMO bears the financial risk in this relationship, gambling
that the patient will require less medical care than can be covered
by the patient's premiums.44 In order to avoid financial loss, the
HMOs develop plans to reduce unnecessary treatment and to
narrow the scope of treatment covered by the plan. If the patient
seeks a treatment not covered by the plan, the patient must bear
the cost of the treatment.
HMOs commonly use two types of fee arrangements with
physicians, with each arrangement resulting in a different
financial incentive for the physician. The two types of fee
arrangements commonly used by HMOs are salary plans and
capitation plans. 45
Under a salary plan, the HMO pays the physician a
salary, and he is paid the same amount of money regardless of the
number of patients he treats or the amount of treatment or care he
provides. 46 Under a salary plan, physicians have a financial
incentive to limit the number of patients they see, and the time
David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to do Less: Financial
Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 155, 156 (1996).
42 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 218.
43 Defensive medicine is the practice of prescribing tests or treatments that
may be unnecessary in order to avoid a later malpractice lawsuit. The practice
of defensive medicine was a result of increasing medical malpractice insurance
costs and increased damage awards at malpractice trials. This practice is said
to cost the healthcare industry millions of dollars of unnecessary costs each
year.
44 See Pegram, 531 U.S. 211.
45 Orentlicher, supra note 41, at 160.
4'

4 Id.
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and treatment they invest in each patient. There is no incentive to
provide excessive care because the physician's salary does not
change with the level of care. A capitation plan, however, pays
the physician a set fee for each patient.47 The physician has a
financial incentive under this plan to increase the number of
patients he sees in order to increase the number of fees.
In addition to these fee structures, HMOs may employ
contractual incentives designed to encourage physicians to limit
care. These cost cutting methods may cause physicians to
withhold or delay treatment in order to limit costs. Methods used
to control costs include utilization review and "scrutinizing
requested services against the contractual provisions to make sure
that a request for care falls within the scope of covered
circumstances . . . or that a given treatment falls within the scope
of the care promised." 48 Among the most questionable cost
containment methods utilized by managed care organizations are
gag clauses, which prohibit physicians from advising patients of
treatment options not covered by the health plan.49 In addition to
HMOs also employ bonuses for cost
these measures,
Fee
containment, expanded capitation and fee withholding.
withholding deducts a portion of the physicians fees to fund
certain patient treatments and services, returning any residual fees
at the end of the year. 50 The cost cutting measure utilized in
Pegram involved a "year-end distribution" of money saved to the
HMOs physician owners; this method pays the physician owners
51.
annually the profit resulting from their cost cutting measures.

47

Id.

Pegram, 530 U.S. at 219.
49 Patricia Mullen Ochmann, Managed Care Organizations Manage to
Escape Liability: Why Issues of Quantity vs. Quality Lead to ERISA's
Inequitable Preemption of Claims, 34 AKRON L. REv. 571, 578 (2001).
48

50 Orentlicher, supra note 41, at 160.
51Id.
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ERISA

In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA 52 to combat
"underfunding and mismanagement of employee pension
plans."53 By enacting ERISA, and including a broad preemption
clause, Congress intended to eliminate conflict between local and
state regulation of benefit plan administration.54 The act gives the
federal government control over the regulation of employee
benefit plans by superceding all state laws that "relate to"
employee benefit plans." This effort to protect employee pension
plans, however, not only resulted in changes in the way pension
funds were administered, but also produced far-reaching effects
on the accountability of HMOs. The broad language of ERISA
allowed HMOs to neatly fall into the category covered by laws
that "relate to" employee benefit plans, resulting in any state
claims against HMOs being preempted under ERISA.
Preemption could occur regardless of whether or not there was a
cause of action available to the plaintiff under ERISA. Utilizing
these loopholes allowed HMOs to escape virtually all liability for
With no malpractice or negligence causes of
their actions.
actions available under ERISA, breach of fiduciary duty remained
the only option for plaintiffs.
A.

Preemption of State Claims

ERISA preempts any state law relating to an employee
benefit plan 56 if that plan is maintained or established by an
employer engaged in commerce, or an organization representing
employees engaged in commerce, or in an industry or activity
affecting commerce. 57 This means that any state law, including a
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1200 (1994)).
13 Goodyear, supra note 11,
at 1110.
4 Ochmann, supra note 49, at 581.
" ERISA § 514(a), codified in 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
56 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994 & Supp. 2001).
57 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1994 & Supp. 2001).
52
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state claim of medical malpractice, can be preempted if it "relates
to" an ERISA plan.
The Act defines employee benefit plans to include plans
that provide "medical,
surgical, or hospital care of
58
benefits.. .through the purchase of insurance or otherwise."
This preemption is effective even if the plaintiff is left with no
remedy under ERISA. 59
"ERISA has left beneficiaries
effectively without remedy when urgently needed care is refused.
Because of ERISA preemption, the states have limited authority
to fix this problem." 60 State laws aimed at correcting the lack of
remedy are preempted if they refer or relate to an ERISA plan.
1)

Qualifying as a Plan Under ERISA

In order to determine if a law is "related to" a plan, and
therefore preempted by ERISA, it is necessary to determine what
a "plan" is. ERISA defines a plan as "any plan, fund, or
program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by
both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was
established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits . . ,,61 Prior to Pegram, this definition encompassed
HMO plans, as HMOs provide the medical benefits described to
the plan beneficiaries.
The decision in Pegram, however,
restricts the definition of a plan to the contract between the HMO
and the employer, rather than the "provisions of documents that
set up the HMO." 62 The plan, therefore, is the contract between
the employer and the HMO, and the relationship between the
HMO and the patient falls outside the boundaries of the "plan."

829 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994 & Supp. 2001).
McLean, supra note 10, at 9.

59

60 Timothy S. Jost, Pegram v. Herdrich: The Supreme Court Confronts
Managed Care, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 187 (2001).
6'29

62

U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994 & Supp. 2001).
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 223.
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By defining "plan" in this manner, the Court restricts
who can be considered a fiduciary under the plan. "[F]iduciary
obligations can apply to managing, advising, and administering
an ERISA plan." 63 As a result of this decision, a fiduciary
obligation can only be applied to those involved in the contract
between the HMO and the employer, not between the HMO and
the patient. The result is that, under some circumstances, a
physician who is part owner of the HMO may have a fiduciary
duty, whereas a physician who is an employee of the HMO may
not.
2)

The "Related to" Problem

ERISA section 514(a) 64 states "[t ] he provisions of this title
and title IV shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan... "65
By using the broad language "related to" in ERISA, Congress
used language that can be interpreted to connect almost any law
to an employee benefit plan. The broad language has allowed
even tenuously connected laws to be preempted and claims to be
removed to federal court. However, in 1995, in N. Y. State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co., 66 the Supreme Court eliminated the preemption of
tenuously connected laws by looking to the objectives of ERISA
and interpreting the scope of the statute that was intended by
Congress.67 The Travelers Court "worked on the 'assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act68unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.'
63

Id.

64
65

Codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a).
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994 & Supp. 2001).

" 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
67

Id. at 655 (a unanimous Court held that a New York statute requiring

hospitals to collect surcharges from certain commercial insurers did not "relate

to" employee benefit plans within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), and
was therefore not preempted).
68 Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))
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The Court determined that the objective of the ERISA
preemption clause was "to ensure that plans and plan sponsors
would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was
to minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying
with conflicting directives among States or between States and the
Federal Government ... and to prevent the potential for conflict
in substantive law . . . requiring the tailoring of plans and
employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each
jurisdiction." 69 So, the congressional intent, and the goal of the
Court, is to avoid repetition or conflict of regulation "in order to
permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit
plans." 70 Using this interpretation, the Court held that laws of
an ERISA plan,
general applicability, that only indirectly affect
71
ERISA.
by
preempted
be
were not intended to
In 1997, the Supreme Court utilized a two-part test to
determine whether a state law was intended to be preempted by
ERISA.72
A law "relates to" a covered employee benefit
73
plan if it has a connection with, or reference to, such a plan.
Even if a law does not refer to ERISA plans, it
if it has a "connection with" ERISA
still
be
pre-empted
may
plans. 7

The Supreme Court also reiterated that state law would
not be superseded unless this was the clear intent of Congress.75
After Travelers, a state law claim might avoid preemption if the
law "does not impede a76'nationally uniform administration of
employee benefit plans.'
69 Id. at 657.
70 Id. at 657.

7"Id. at 668.
72 California

Div.

of Labor

Standards

Enforcement

v.

Dillingham

Construction, 519 U.S. 316, 324 (1997).
73Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd.of Trade, 506
U.S. 125, 129 (1992)).
74 Id. (clarifying this statement by utilizing the holding in Travelers, looking
to the objectives of ERISA to determine the scope of state law intended to be
preempted by Congress).
75 Id. at 325.
76

Ochmann, supra note 49, at 585.
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Fiduciary Duty

Section 409 of ERISA 77 states that any fiduciary who
breaches any of the duties under ERISA is personally liable for
any loss to the plan resulting from the breach.78 A fiduciary is
defined by ERISA as someone acting in the capacity of manager,
administrator, or financial advisor to a plan. 79 The fiduciary
conflict claimed in Pegram was a result of the potential conflict
between the physician-owner of the plan and the plan beneficiary.
The Court noted that a fiduciary "may have financial
interests adverse to beneficiaries," 8 0 such as when an
administrator wears more than one hat at a time by acting as
administrator, employer or plan sponsor. However, the Court
made it clear that when acting as both fiduciary and as plan
administrator, the "fiduciary with two hats wear[s] only one at a
time, and wear[s] the fiduciary hat when making fiduciary
decisions. " 8 In order to determine if a fiduciary has breached
his duty, it is first necessary to determine whether the function he
was performing was fiduciary in nature.8 2 The physicians in
Carle owed duties not only to the patient, but to "Carle Clinic,
and to the ERISA plan itself. "3 The prospect of receiving a
large bonus at the end of the year, a bonus that increased as
patient care costs are cut, may easily act as an incentive to limit
care to the patient. This effect on medical decisionmaking may
impair a fiduciary relationship with the patient. Therefore, the
financial incentive structure of a plan may imply or cause a
conflict of fiduciary duty under ERISA.

7Codified in 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
7'29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1994).

'929 U.S.C. § 1102 (1994).
'oPegram, 530 U.S. at 225.
81

Id.

82 Id.
83

at 226.

McLean, supra note 10, at 18.
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TYPES OF DECISIONS

In order to evaluate whether a claim for a decision made
by an HMO or physician is preempted under ERISA, it must be
determined what kind of decision it is. Decisions may involve:
the quantity of care, or the denial of benefits; the quality of care,
or the actual treatment provided by the physician; or a
combination of quality and quantity of care, treatment decisions
made by the physicians based on what benefits are covered by the
HMO.
Quantity decisions, decisions involving denial of benefits84
or eligibility for benefits are typically preempted by ERISA.
These claims are based on the assertion that the welfare plan
withheld a plan benefit due the plaintiff. ERISA § 502 provides
redress for plaintiffs when promised benefits are not provided to
them. Section 502 makes available a claim against an HMO,
allowing plaintiffs seeking a remedy for a health care benefit that
85
was covered by the HMO, yet was refused to the plaintiff.
Therefore, claims seeking remedy for denial of promised benefits
would be preempted under ERISA.
Claims involving treatment decisions by physicians are not
preempted, and thus may be litigated in state court. 86 ERISA
§ 502 does not provide a remedy for claims involving the quality
of care the plaintiff received under the plan. Quality of health
care benefits are a "field traditionally occupied by state
regulation," 87 and courts have interpreted the silence of Congress

Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995); Corcoran v. U.S.
Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a plaintiff's
84

claim against her HMO for denial of complete bed rest during her pregnancy,

resulting in the death of her fetus, was preempted by ERISA, because it was a
denial of benefits claim).
85Id. at 357.
86 Dukes, 57 F.3d at 350 (holding that the plaintiffs claim for the death of her
newborn due to the negligence of the physician could go forward in state
court).

7 Id. at 357.
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on the issue of preemption of claims involving treatment decisions
"as reflecting an intent that it remain as such. "88
It is the combination of treatment and benefit decisions,
where physicians make treatment decisions based on benefits that
are available in the HMO that was the basis of the dispute in
Pegram. There are no distinct lines drawn in determining
whether a decision is a benefit eligibility, treatment or mixed
eligibility treatment decision and this subjective determination has
led to frequently conflicting court decisions regarding whether a
particular claim should be preempted by ERISA.
1)

Mixed Eligibility Treatment Decisions"9

The decisions at issue in Pegram were termed by the
Court as mixed eligibility treatment decisions. Mixed decisions
are those that combine eligibility decisions and treatment
decisions. Pure eligibility decisions are defined by the Court as
decisions that "turn on the plan's coverage of a particular
condition or medical procedure for its treatment. "90
Alternatively, treatment decisions "are choices about how to go
about diagnosing and treating a patient's condition. " 91 These two

types of decisions, however, are often not easily separated from
one another.92 Mixed eligibility treatment decisions combine the
questions of coverage with the best route for diagnosing and
treating a patient. This type of decisionmaking combines both
administrative and medical considerations. The decision in
Pegram was just this type of mixed decision: diagnosing
Herdrich's abdominal mass, utilizing a facility staffed by Carle,
and determining the necessity for treating the
illness as an
93
decision.
one
into
combined
all
were
emergency
8s Id.; see also Travelers, 514 U.S. at 645.
89 "Mixed eligibility treatment decision" is the phrase used by the Supreme
Court in Pegram to refer to decisions combining eligibility for benefit
decisions with treatment decisions.
90 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228.
'91Id.
92

Id.at 229.

93 Id.
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Mixed Decisions as Fiduciaryin Nature

Pegram held that mixed eligibility treatment decisions
made by a health maintenance organization were not fiduciary
acts and, therefore, there was no federal claim for breach of
fiduciary duty. 94 The Court determined that Congress did not
intend HMOs, acting through their physicians, to be treated as
fiduciaries when making mixed decisions.95
The Court
distinguished between an HMO and a traditional trustee, noting
that "[t ] rustees buy, sell, and lease investment property, lend and
borrow, and do other things to conserve and nurture assets .... " 96
These duties revolve around financial decisions and protecting
assets, with only a distant resemblance to the mixed eligibility
decisions made by HMOs. The Court determined that it was
financial decisions, not these mixed decisions that Congress
intended to label as fiduciary in nature.97
The Court also realized another potential result of holding
HMOs to a fiduciary responsibility when making mixed
decisions: the virtual elimination of the for-profit HMO. The
remedy for breach of fiduciary duty is return of profits realized
by the breach. This would mean the return of all profits of any
incentive program, or other profit enhancing method utilized by
the HMO. Since HMOs operate for profit, elimination of the
profit would mean elimination of the HMOs. This potential
result, coupled with Congress's history of encouraging the
formation of HMOs, led the Court to infer that Congress did not
intend for ERISA to include a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty against HMOs. 9s
"[T]he Court saw no reason to turn traditional medical
malpractice cases into ERISA fiduciary cases simply because the
treating physician assumed some of the financial risk for the

94Id. at 215.
95 d. at 231.
96Pegram, 530 U.S at 231.
97 Id.
9' Id. at 234.
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treatment of the patient." 99 Although the Court found that there
was no ERISA claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the Court did
not discount a state breach of fiduciary duty claim, noting that the
standard used to determine breach would resemble the medical
malpractice standard. 1°° Although a state breach of fiduciary duty
claim would have previously opened the door for ERISA
preemption, as a result of the Court's holding in Pegram, the
claim will not be preempted without clear congressional intent to
do so. Therefore, if physicians are held liable under a state cause
of action for either malpractice or fiduciary duty, "the HMO
[will] be held vicariously liable for the physician's conduct if it
employed the physicians or represents to the public that the
101
physicians are the HMOs agent."

D.

Remedies under ERISA

Plaintiffs struggle to avoid ERISA preemption because of
the limited remedies available under ERISA. Remedies available
under ERISA §1132 are limited to equitable relief. 10 2 Unlike
state tort claims, actions brought under ERISA do not result in
punitive damages; rather, ERISA remedies are limited to
declaratory or injunctive relief. And, although trust law typically
provides for "make whole" remedies that put the plaintiff "in the
position in which he would have been if the trustee had not
committed the breach of trust,"' 03 courts have not fully embraced
this remedy as applied to ERISA. Five circuits have held that
plaintiffs are precluded from recovering punitive or compensatory
Even though ERISA
damages under ERISA's § 1132.'0 4

" Louis Saccoia, Pegram's Significance for Managed Health Care, 1 YALE
J. HFALTH POL'Y L. & ETHIcs 195, 197 (2001).
'00 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 235.

0toMcLean, supra note 10, at 30.
29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994 & Supp. 2001).
103 Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 157 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring ) (citing Restatement 2d of Trusts §205).
'04 Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1336; Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651 (7th
Cir. 1992); Novak v. Anderson, 962 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1992); Bishop v.
102
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provides only for equitable remedy, the plaintiff still faces
preemption of state law claims. 10 5 If the plan participant dies,
even the limited remedies available under ERISA are no longer
enforceable. The survivors cannot seek to enforce the deceased
106
participant's rights.
V.

Avoiding ERISA Preemption and Removal

HMOs seek to use ERISA to preempt all state claims
against the HMO into federal court, where causes of action and
remedies are extremely limited, and where there will be little
financial redressibility for any wrongdoing on their part.
Plaintiffs strive to maintain their claims in state court, where
punitive and compensatory damages are available, and their
negligence and other tort claims can go forward. So how does a
plaintiff avoid preemption? There are no absolutes, but several
tactics are available to plaintiffs.
A.

Basis for claim

Following Pegram, mixed eligibility-treatment decisions,
as well as treatment decisions, are not preempted by ERISA. The
resemblance of claims involving treatment or mixed eligibility
decisions to state negligence claims, and the silence of Congress
on the issue of preemption of state claims against HMOs, cause
the courts be reluctant to preempt these claims into federal court.
Negligence claims are historically tried in state court, and federal
courts are reluctant to clog up the federal system with claims that
strongly resemble those traditionally tried in state court. If a
plaintiff can demonstrate that the decision is not a mere benefit
denial, he may be able to avoid preemption.

Osborn Transp., 838 F.2d 1173 (11th Cir. 1988); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803

F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1986).
105Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1336.
106

Jane M. Mulcahy, The ERISA Preemption Question: Why Some HMO

Members are Dying for Congress to Amend ERISA, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 877,
883 (1999).
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Well-Pleaded Complaints

According to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a claim must raise an
issue of federal law on its face. 10 7 In order to be removed, a
complaint must assert a federal claim. The defendant cannot
remove a state claim to federal court solely by using a federal law
based defense. If a complaint contains only state claims, it may
withstand preemption unless that area of law has been completely
preempted by federal law.'08 Under 29 U.S.C. § 1144, ERISA
preempts claims involving laws "related to" an employee benefit
plan.109 The Supreme Court in Travelers held that state laws that
have only a "tenuous, remote, or peripheral connection" 110 will
not be preempted by ERISA. However, under §1132, when " a
plan participant brings a claim against an HMO which seeks to
recover benefits due, to enforce his rights, or to clarity his rights,
the claim is completely preempted by ERISA and automatically
presents a federal question which must be addressed in federal
court." "' A claim is only completely preempted if it falls within
the civil enforcement provisions of § 502112 of ERISA. "State
law claims which fall outside of the scope of § 502, even if
preempted by § 514(a), are still governed by the well-pleaded
complaint rule and, therefore, are not removable under the
complete-preemption principles .

. .

ERISA preemption

under § 514(a) does not justify removal on it's own, unless it falls
within ERISA's enforcement provisions. 114 Without a § 502
claim, the well pleaded complaint rule can prevent preemption by
the defendant.

10728 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
too Mulcahy, supra note 106, at 883.
'09 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994 & Supp. 2001).
no Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655.
.. Mulcahy, supra note 106, at 886 (referring to Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987))
1'2 Codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
"' Dukes, 57 F.3d at 355.
114

Id.
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New State Laws

Some states are revamping their state laws in an attempt to
avoid ERISA preemption. In 1997, Texas enacted a law giving
plaintiffs injured by an HMO the statutory right to sue the HMO
for malpractice. 115 This law provides: "A health insurance
carrier, health maintenance organization, or other managed care
entity for a health care plan has the duty to exercise ordinary care
when making health care treatment decisions and is liable for
damages for harm to an insured or enrollee proximately caused
by its failure to exercise such ordinary care." 116 The statute
defines a health care treatment decision as "a determination made
when medical services are actually provided by the health care
plan and a decision which affects the quality of the diagnosis,
care, or treatment provided to the plan's insureds or
enrollees.""1 7 This statute essentially provides a state cause of
action for medical treatment provided by the HMO that has
harmed a beneficiary, as well as a vicarious liability claim against
the health plan.' 8 In Corporate Health Insurance v. Texas
Department of Insurance,"9 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
liability provisions of the law, as applied to services actually
provided, was not preempted by ERISA.1 20 A petition for a writ
of certiorari is pending before the Supreme Court in the Texas
case.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The protection enjoyed by HMOs against state claims was
eliminated by the Supreme Court in Pegram. As a result of this
decision, plaintiffs may now seek redress in state court against
HMOs for injuries they received as a result of inappropriate
' Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 88.001-88.003 (2002).
6 Id. at § 88.002(a).
"
1

Id. at § 88.001(5).

Corporate Health Ins. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir.

2000).
119 Id.
120 id.
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mixed eligibility treatment decisions. HMOs may not continue to
escape liability for their cost cutting measures now that plaintiffs
have the opportunity to seek remedy in state court for negligence,
breach of fiduciary duty, and vicarious liability against the
HMOs.
HMOs may have to review their procedures for
containing costs and their treatment decisions in order to avoid
breach of fiduciary duty claims against physicians and HMO
administrators and physicians held out to be agents of the HMO.
The plaintiff has been given a new opportunity to seek
compensation for injuries under state law, as opposed to merely
obtaining equitable remedies under ERISA. While the HMO
community lauded the Pegram decision as a victory, barring a
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA for
mixed eligibility decisions, they may find that they must answer
in state courts, at a much higher price. A direct decision by the
Court on the preemption of state statutes imposing liability on
HMOs would further clarify the issue. Perhaps the Texas case
will further illuminate this controversial issue.
A better method for imposing negligence or fiduciary
liability on HMOs would be for Congress to enact new
legislation. Such legislation could establish a uniform means for
providing redressibility for plaintiffs who suffer from the
negligence of their HMOs, and this uniformity would only further
the purposes of the HMO Act and ERISA. Legislation to limit
financial incentives to cut costs would also serve to protect plan
beneficiaries. Until such legislation is established, however, the
results will be left in the hands of the courts.
In the meantime, some cases have been remanded by the
Supreme Court in light of the Pegram decision. For example,
Pappas v. Asbel121 was remanded by the Supreme Court to the
22
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, to be reheard in light of Pegram.1
Using the Pegram analysis, the Pennsylvania court affirmed its

12'724

A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998), vacated sub nom. U.S. Healthcare Systems of
Pa. v. Pennsylvania Hosp. Ins., 530 U.S. 1241 (2000), and aff'd sub nom.
Pappas v. Asbel 768 A.2d 1089 (2001).
'2Pappas, 768 A.2d at 1090.
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claim against the HMO was
opinion that the medical negligence
23
1
ERISA.
by
not preempted
If courts begin to consider the preemption issue in the
manner demonstrated by theCourt in Pegram, HMOs will have
to accept liability for the decisions they make, and the decisions
their physicians make in order to conform with HMO guidelines.
If the state cause of action is not preempted, the HMO is
susceptible to more extensive remedies than are available under
ERISA, which may prove to be far more costly than revamping
cost cutting measures.

123 Id.
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